

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

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USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01

DRC-01 /151 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2803

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 4414

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: PLENARY SESSION MAY 16, 1974

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE SECOND PLENARY OF THE THIRD ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WAS HELD ON MAY 16, 1974 UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF UK REP AMBASSADOR ROSE. THE ONLY STATEMENT WAS DELIVERED BY POLISH REP MINISTER STRULAK. STRULAK REITERATED THE EASTERN POSITION THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY REQUIRED REDUCTIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE BEGINNING. STRULAK STATED THAT THE SIX WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MUST UNEQUIVOCALLY STATE THEIR READINESS TO REDUCE ALONG WITH THE U.S. HE CLAIMED THAT THE PRESENT WESTERN PROPOSAL ADVERSELY AFFECTED POLISH, CZECH AND GDR SECURITY SINCE THE NON-U.S. NATIONAL FORCES OF THE NATO

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STATES HAVE A SIZABLE PREPONDERANCE OVER THOSE OF

THE THREE NSWP STATES. HE CHARGED THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WOULD PERMIT A GROWTH IN NON-U.S. NATO FORCES AND WOULD RESULT IN THE INCREASE OF THEIR RELATIVE IMPORTANCE. THE NEXT PLENARY MEETING WAS SCHEDULED FOR 22 MAY. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT.

MR CHAIRMAN,

1. AS WE ENTER ON THE THIRD ROUND OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, THERE SEEMS TO BE A COMMON REALIZATION AROUND THIS TABLE OF THE NEED TO MAKE PROPER USE OF THE RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS HELD SO FAR. WE FEEL IT NECESSARY TO CONCENTRATE ON QUESTIONS WHOSE SOLUTION OFFERS BEST CHANCES FOR THE BEGINNING OF THE PROCESS OF MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

2. INDEED, AN AGREEMENT ON THE EARLY PRACTICAL BEGINNING OF REDUCTIONS WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. IT WOULD GIVE IMPETUS TO THE PROCESS OF MILITARY DETENTE, AND - WE BELIEVE - WOULD HAVE DESIRABLE POLITICAL EFFECTS, IMMEDIATELY CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROCLAIMED GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF FURTHERING PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE STATES - PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY AT ITS RECENT MEETING, HELD IN THE CAPITAL OF MY COUNTRY, ONCE AGAIN POINTED OUT TO THE NEED OF SUPPLEMENTING POLITICAL DETENTE WITH MILITARY DETENTE.

3. AN ANALYSIS OF THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES, MADE WITH A VIEW TO FINDING COMMON ELEMENTS IN THEM, IS CERTAINLY THE RIGHT WAY TO PREPARE FOR AN UNDERSTANDING. HOWEVER, TO PRODUCE VALID RESULTS, IT SHOULD BE OBJECTIVE AND REALISTIC. ONLY SUCH AN ANALYSIS PROMISES A REALISTIC PROSPECT OF FINDING DESIRED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

4. WE SHOULD ALL PROCEED FROM THE AGREED ASSUMPTION, WHICH IS BASIC TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AND TO THE FUTURE AGREEMENT, THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OFF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED IS TO BE COMPLIED WITH - " IN ALL CONFIDENTIAL

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RESPECTS AND AT EVERY POINT", TO USE THE WORDS OF THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS.

5. AS MY COLLEAGUE AMBASSADOR R. KLEIN POINTED OUT AT THE LAST PLENARY MEETING, THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS PRINCIPLE TO THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAS AGAIN BEEN REAFFIRMED IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED WARSAW MEETING OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE STATES-

PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY. AS THE COMMUNIQUE STRESSES, THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY GIVES FULL POSSIBILITY OF CONSTRUCTIVE AGREEMENT ON REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

6. IN THEIR STATEMENTS DURING THE PAST TWO ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS, AND ABOVE ALL THE FOUR SPONSORS OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, ELABORATED ON THE PRINCIPAL TRAITS OF THEIR APPROACH WHICH DIRECTLY FLOWED FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.

7. I PROPOSE TODAY TO SPEAK, IN PARTICULAR, ABOUT ONE REQUIREMENT WHICH IS, INDEED, CRUCIAL IN THE POSITION OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. IT IS ESPECIALLY VITAL FOR POLAND. I HAVE IN MIND THE REQUIREMENT OF THE PARTICIPATION IN THE REDUCTION PROCESS OF ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING.

8. THE STRENGTH OF OUR ARGUEMENTS IN FAVOUR OF SUCH PROPOSAL DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENTLY PERCEIVED BY OUR

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2804

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMASSY BONN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 4414

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

WESTERN COLLEAGUES. NATURALLY, WE HAVE NOTED THAT IN HIS LATEST STATEMENT THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NETHERLANDS RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION OF WHOSE ARMED FORCES ARE TO BE INCLUDED IN THE REDUCTIONS FROM THE BEGINNING. HOWEVER, THE READY ANSWER THAT HE HAS RECOMMENDED TO THIS QUESTION, NAMELY THE SUGGESTION TO DEAL WITH THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN GROUND FORCES ALONE, UNFORTUNATELY CANNOT BE TRACED TO ANY COMMON ELEMENT IN THE RESPECTIVE ATTITUDES. IT IS NOT RIGHT TO ISOLATE THE ISSUE OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND MAINTAIN THAT THIS IS A POINT COMMON TO BOTH SIDES. THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN ARMED FORCES IS FORESEEN IN OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT BUT IN A CLOSE, INSEPARABLE CONNECTION WITH THAT OF THE FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS- BOTH WESTERN AND SOCIALIST.

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9. THERE IS A NUMBER OF HIGHLY IMPORTANT REASONS, POLITICAL AND MILITARY, WHY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CONSIDER WESTERN PROPOSALS FOR AMERICAN AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS INSUFFICIENT, WHY WE CONTINUE ASKING THE 6 WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO STATE CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY THEIR READINESS TO ACTUALLY START THE PROCESS OF REDUCTIONS TOGETHER WITH THEIR AMERICAN ALLY, AND THE FOUR SOCIALIST STATES.

10. IN POLITICAL TERMS, HAVING IN MIND THE INTERESTS OF POLAND IN PARTICULAR, THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL STATES CONCERNED, OF ALL 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, IS A BASIC REQUIREMENT FOR AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY DETENTE. THIS HAS TO BE A COMPREHENSIVE PROCESS. MEASURES OF REDUCTION LIMITED TO THE TWO POWERS - THE USSR AND US, AS SUGGESTED IN THE WESTERN PLAN OF THE FIRST PHASE, WOULD HAVE A CLEARLY INSUFFICIENT INFLUENCE ON LOWERING THE EXISTING DEGREE OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION. THEY WOULD NOT AFFECT SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OF THE CONFRONTATION, FIRST OF ALL THE LARGEST NATIONAL COMPONENTS.

11. ENHANCED SECURITY, WHICH IS OUR AGREED AIM, HAS TO BE BASED ON EQUAL, MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS. A REDUCTION AGREEMENT LIMITED TO US AND USSR FORCES WOULD MEAN THAT OTHER STATES - DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, INCLUDING THOSE WHOSE TERRITORIES FORM THE AREA OF REDUCTION, COULD FOR SOME UNDETERMINED LENGTH OF TIME CONSIDER THEMSELVES FORMALLY FREED FROM THE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE OBLIGATION TO PRACTICALLY CONTRIBUTE

TO MILITARY AND, CONSEQUENTLY, POLITICAL DETENTE.

12. IN MILITARY TERMS, AND IN THIS REGARD THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF MY COUNTRY COUNT TO NO LESSER DEGREE, CONFINING REDUCTION TO THE FORCES OF TWO POWERS RUNDS CLEARLY IN OUR DISFAVOUR. MY COLLEAGUES FROM OTHER SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS, THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN PARTICULAR, HAVE POINTED OUT TO THE CLOSE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN ALL FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES IN THE MILITARY SET-UP OF BOTH THE NATO AND THE WARSAW TREATY IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION. HAVING IN MIND THEIR DIFFERENT ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE STRENGTH WITHIN THE RESPECTIVE ALLIANCES, THE SINGLING OUT FOR REDUCTION OF AMERICAN FORCES ON ONE SIDE AND THE SOVIET ON THE OTHER, CANNOT BUT BE VIEWED AS TENDING TO AFFECT THE DEFENSE STRUCTURE

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OF THE WARSAW TREATY.

13. THE IMPORTANT FACT REMAINS THAT THE NATIONAL ARMED FORCES FORM THE LARGEST COMPONENT OF THE MILITARY SET-UP IN THE AREA AND THAT THE NATIONAL FORCES OF THE NATO STATES HAVE A SIZABLE PREPONDERANCE OVER THOSE OF THE 3 SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THE BUNDESWEHR ALONE ACCOUNTS FOR ABOUT 1/2 OF THE NATO FORCES IN THE AREA. EVEN THE SHEER FACT OF LEAVING THOSE FORCES OUTSIDE THE REDUCTION FRAMEWORK WOULD RESULT IN THE INCREASE OF THEIR RELATIVE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL WEIGHT TO THE CLEAR DISADVANTAGE OF POLAND, AS WELL AS CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND GDR. A GROWTH OF THESE FORCES, THAT IS PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE WESTERN PROPOSAL, WOULD ANNUL THE VERY SENSE OF AGREEMENT.

14. TRYING TO SUBSTANTIATE SOME POINTS OF THEIR PROPOSALS OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES USED TO REFER HERE TO THEIR "SPECIAL CONCERNS". ON OUR PART, WE WOULD WISH THEM TO PONDER OVER OUR LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS. MINDFUL OF POLAND'S PAST EXPERIENCE AS WELL AS HER GEO-STRATEGIC SITUATION, WE UNMISTAKABLY IDENTIFY OUR CONCERNS AS LARGELY ACCRUING FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED MAJOR NATIONAL COMPONENT OF THE WESTERN MILITARY CAPACITY IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. NOT ONLY DO WE FIND THIS CONCERN OF OURS UNANSWERED IN THE WESTERN REDUCTION SCHEME, BUT THIS SCHEME GIVES RISE TO THE FURTHER AGGRAVATION OF OUR MISAPPREHENSIONS BECAUSE OF THE PROPOSED DISPROPORTIONATELY LARGE SOVIET WITHDRAWALS.

15. BEING REALISTS, WE DO NOT ASK FOR ANY SPECIAL TREATMENT OF SOME OR OTHER ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, WHETHER NATIONAL OR FOREIGN, IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE. WE DO NOT PROPOSE REDUCING ANY OF THEM TO A DEGREE GREATER THAN THE OTHER. AT THE SAME TIME WE DO NOT PROPOSE TO SPARE ANY ONE, ANY DIRECT PARTICIPANT FROM INVOLVEMENT IN REDUCTIONS. POLAND, JUST LIKE HER THREE SOCIALIST ALLIES, SINCERELY OFFERED OUR

OWN PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE REDUCTION, RIGHT FROM THE BEGINNING.

16. IF WE SO CONSISTENTLY APPEAL TO THE 6 WESTERN DELEGATIONS TO RECIPROCATATE THIS OFFER OF OURS, IT IS BECAUSE WE DEEM THIS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROGRESS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS AND WE ARE SINCERELY INTERESTED IN ACHIEVING SUCH PROGRESS. HOWEVER, THE
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PROGRESS IS HARDLY POSSIBLE AS LONG AS SOME MAJOR PARTICIPANTS OF THE FUTURE REDUCTION AGREEMENT SHUN THEIR CLEAR-CUT OBLIGATIONS TO ACTUALLY CONTRIBUTE THAT AGREEMENT FROM THE VERY ONSET. ON THE OTHER HAND IT WILL BE GREATLY FACILITATED IF THEY UNEQUIVOCALLY UNDERTAKE THAT MUTUAL OBLIGATION.

17. THUS, OUR ANSWER TO THE QUESTION, WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BEGIN REDUCTION, IS: THE ARMED FORCES OF ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. IT IS A WELL MOTIVATED AND LOGICAL ANSWER. IT IS DICTATED BY THE REASONS OF OUR UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. IT IS IN CONCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS.

18. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT A CONSENSUS ALONG THE LINES OF SUCH AN ANSWER WOULD REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT STRIDE TOWARDS ACCORD ON A FIRST REDUCTION STEP THAT WE ARE APPARENTLY ALL WILLING TO ACHIEVE WITHOUT UNNECESSARY DELAY. END TEXT.HUMES

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